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PERSONAL TORTS
Frank L. Branson *
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. DUTY
URING the Survey period, Texas courts decided a number of cases
interpreting the evolving concept of duty. Gutierrez v. Scripps-How-
ard' analyzed a newspaper's duty to warn a freelance photographer
of the dangers involved in an assignment. The newspaper assigned the pho-
tographer to take pictures of a hotel opening in Juarez, Mexico, where he
sustained personal injuries for which he sued. The El Paso court of appeals
reasoned that because the newspaper previously published articles claiming
the hotel owner was a "drug czar" and the fact that drug dealers are violent,
the newspaper had a duty to warn the photographer of the dangers involved
in the assignment. 2 The court expressly rejected the newspaper's argument
under Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.3 that to be liable they must be
aware of similar prior criminal activity. The court concluded that the sum-
mary judgment was improper because the defendant did not prove there was
no material issue of fact as to whether the assault resulted from the newspa-
per's articles.4
McCullough v. Amstar Corp. 5 held that a defendant had no duty when he
could not reasonably have foreseen the risk.6 McCullough alleged that he
suffered heart problems as a result of inhaling toxic fumes while loading a
corn by-product. The summary judgment evidence sufficiently established
that the defendant could not reasonably foresee any risk because plaintiff's
reaction was unique and unprecedented. 7 Since the danger was unforesee-
able, the defendant did not owe any duty.
Western Co. of North America v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 8 is
another case where Texas courts have further defined the concept of duty.
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., L.L.M., Southern Methodist University, At-
torney at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
The author expresses his gratitude to Randall Tinney, B.S. University of Texas; J.D. ex-
pected May 1993, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, for his thorough research
and assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 823 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
2. Id. at 699.
3. 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985).
4. Gutierrez, 823 S.W.2d at 702.
5. 833 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, n.w.h.).
6. Id. at 316.
7. Id. at 315.
8. 819 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
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In Western Company, a truck stopped at a stop sign with its trailer extending
over the railroad tracks. The train ran into the truck and the railroad com-
pany sued the trucking company for negligence. The court of appeals con-
cluded that the exclusion of evidence by the trial court tending to show that
the track was located too close to the intersection amounting to a want of
ordinary care, was reversible error.9 The Austin court of appeals held that
the creation or maintenance of an extra hazardous railroad crossing was en-
compassed within the ground of negligence and that the railroad company
owed a duty of ordinary care.10
In Williams v. Bill's Custom Fit, Inc. '1 the plaintiff sued under the attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine to establish liability for leaving keys in a car. The
fifteen year old plaintiff was injured while a passenger in a stolen vehicle.
The court held that the plaintiff was a trespasser as to the automobile and
that the defendant only owed the duty "not to injure him willfully, wantonly
or through gross negligence."' 2 It was irrelevant whether the plaintiff knew
the car was stolen since he committed the trespass by voluntary act.' 3
In Elliot v. State of Texas'4 the San Antonio court of appeals held that a
park officer does not have a duty to insure the safety of boaters.' 5 A park
officer cited a boater for failing to have a life preserver in his boat. Shortly
thereafter, the boater fell in the water and drowned. His estate brought a
wrongful death action alleging negligence against the park officer. In finding
no duty, the court relied on Dent v. City of Dallas16 which held that law
enforcement officers are not the insurers of the safety of law violators. 7
Puente v. A.S.I, Signs 8 and Ball v. SGB Construction Services, Inc. 19 both
stated that a defendant did not owe a duty when it did not install or inspect
the object causing injury. In Puente, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
company owed a duty of care because it inspected or should have inspected
the signs while on the property to install other signs. The court in Puente
determined that a company owed no legal duty to inspect signs that it had
not made, designed, or installed.20 Similarly, the Ball court held that the
scaffolding supplier did not owe a duty to the subcontractor's injured em-
ployee where it neither determined quantities or types of scaffolding materi-
als required nor erected the scaffolding. 2'
9. Id. at 955.
10. Id. at 956.
11. 821 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ).
12. Id. at 434.
13. Id. at 435.
14. 818 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
15. Id. at 74.
16. 729 S.W.2d 114 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977
(1988).
17. Id. at 117.
18. 821 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
19. 820 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
20. Puente, 821 S.W.2d at 402.




Proximate cause is the next element to be considered in a negligence case.
Proximate cause is defined as
cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces an
event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred.
In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of
must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen
that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result there-
from. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event. 22
In Almaraz v. Burke23 the court affirmed a jury's findings that the negli-
gence of a driver who caused a first accident proximately caused a second
accident which occurred ten minutes later.24 The defendant argued that
there was no evidence to support questions concerning negligence because he
was ten minutes down the road when the second accident occurred. The
court reasoned, however, that a jury could have concluded from the evidence
that the defendant driver caused the first accident and conditionally and
proximately caused the second accident.25 The court distinguished this case
from Bell v. Campbell,26 where an accident occurred and the drivers in-
volved were not liable for injuries caused by the subsequent accident because
the injuries were unforeseeable. In contrast, the Almaraz court reasoned
that the conditions resulting from the first accident made it foreseeable that a
second accident would occur. 27
In Travis v. City of Mesquite,28 the Texas Supreme Court held that police
officers are not insulated from liability as a matter of law for damages proxi-
mately caused by a high speed chase. 29 The reasonableness of their actions
is a fact issue which must be determined by a jury.
In Fitzsimmons v. Brake Check, Inc.,30 a wheel that fell off a car due to
faulty repairs was not the proximate cause of an auto accident. In that case,
a driver stopped to avoid the tire and was strck from behind by a truck.
The driver sued the automobile repair shop contending that the faulty re-
pairs were the proximate cause of the collision. Contrary to the driver's
contention, the court found that the truck driver who struck her from be-
22. 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 2.04 (1987).
23. 827 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
24. Id. at 81.
25. Id. A van driven by Almaraz, hit a Fiat leaving it disabled and sitting sideways on the
overhead. Ten minutes later Burke drove his Bronco into the Fiat and another driver crashed
into Burke's Bronco.
26. 434 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Tex. 1968).
27. Almaraz, 827 S.W.2d at 82.
28. 830 S.W. 2d 94 (Tex. 1992). When the Texas Supreme Court originally released this
opinion, it held that the police officers may be liable for an accident that is caused by a high
speed chase, if, under the circumstances the chase was unreasonable. The opinion also dis-
cussed the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law immunity. 34 Sup. Ct. J. 231 (De-
cember 31, 1990). However, on rehearing, that opinion was withdrawn and replaced by the
current opinion which held that material issues of fact exist as to whether off-duty police
officers, who are involved in a high speed chase of a suspect, proximately caused the accident
thereby precluding summary judgment.
29. 830 S.W.2d at 96.
30. 832 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
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hind was the sole proximate cause of the accident.3 1 '
In Otis Elevator Co. v. Shows 32 a child's hand was caught between the
handrail and the handrail guard of the escalator. The defendants argued that
the child proximately caused her own injuries and as a result, defendant was
entitled to an instruction on the issue of unavoidable accident. The trial
court refused defendants' request and the court of appeals affirmed holding
that since the escalator had handrail guards to prevent such an occurrence,
the accident was foreseeable and therefore not unavoidable.33 Further, the
court of appeals noted an unavoidable accident instruction would have been
an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. 34
Finally, in Hughes v. Thrash35 a bail of cotton fell on the plaintiff. The
court held that the plaintiff was not required to prove the precise cause of the
accident but rather only that the defendant knew the bail could fall and that
it in fact did fall. 36 Despite the defendant's arguments to the contrary, the
court concluded that the defendant's knowledge of the danger was the only
relevant area of inquiry.37
C. NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
Loom Craft Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Gorrel3 8 established that "negligent en-
trustment liability is derivative in nature."'39 Following a night of drinking,
Gorrell was injured when he fell after getting out of a truck which then ran
over him. The jury found the driver of the truck eighty-five percent at fault
and Gorrell fifteen percent at fault. On appeal, the defendants argued that
comparative negligence should have been attributed to the owners of the
truck as well as the driver and Gorrell. The court expressly rejected this
argument concluding that "the better rule is to apportion fault only among
those directly involved in the accident and to hold the entruster liable for the
percentage of fault apportioned to the driver." 4 The court expressly de-
clined to follow cases from other jurisdictions where fault was apportioned
to the entruster.4 ' Further, the court held that "[i]f the owner is negligent,
his liability for the acts of the driver is established, and the degree of negli-
31. Id. at 449.
32. 822 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
33. Id. at 63.
34. The definition of unavoidable accident includes "such non-human things as fog, snow,
sleet, wet or slick pavement, or obstruction of the view." Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d
188, 191 (Tex. 1971). In order to be entitled to an instruction on unavoidable accident, there
must be affirmative evidence brought forth of the causal connection between the occurrence in
question and some extraneous condition or event other than the conduct of the parties to the
occurrence. Hukill v. H.E.B. Food Stores, Inc., 756 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ); Leatherwood Drilling Co. v. TXL Oil Corp., 379 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. 832 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
36. Id. at 783.
37. Id. at 783-84.
38. 823 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, n.w.h.).
39. Id. at 432.
40. Id.
41. Id. at n.7.
1650 [Vol. 46
PERSONAL TORTS
gence of the owner would be of no consequence. '42
D. CRIMINAL CONDUCT BY A THIRD PARTY
The Texas Supreme Court heard two significant cases dealing with liabil-
ity for damages caused by the criminal conduct of third parties. Havner v.
E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. 43 involved the abduction and murder of a convenience
store clerk. There were no witnesses and the assailant was never caught.
Her family brought wrongful death and survival actions against the store's
owner alleging that the employer's failure to provide a safe place to work
was the proximate cause of her abduction, rape, and murder. The trial court
rendered judgment against E-Z Mart and the court of appeals reversed,
holding that there was no evidence that inadequate security measures at the
store were the cause of her death. 44 Further, the court of appeals held that
since there were no witnesses, there was no evidence that Havner would
have been in a position to use security devices if installed, or that such de-
vices would have prevented her abduction.45 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals and held that producing cause could be
demonstrated by circumstantial evidence and that expert testimony of inves-
tigating police officers was some evidence of causation. 46 The plaintiffs were
not required to "prove their case to an absolute degree of certainty" by dis-
proving other possible causes.47 The case was remanded back to the Texar-
kana court of appeals, which held that the evidence on causation was
factually insufficient. 48 The Texas Supreme Court again granted writ of er-
ror to consider whether the court of appeals erred in their holding.49
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ of error in Exxon Corp. v.
Tidwell5" to consider the extent of a landlord's duty to the employees of its
tenants. In this case, a gas station employee was shot during a robbery at an
Exxon service station leased to his employer. The trial court rendered judg-
ment against Exxon.5 1 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Exxon
breached its duty of care.5 2 The court of appeals held that Exxon owed the
employee a duty of care because Exxon retained extensive control over the
service station's operations under the lease, and that security measures taken
at other stations leased by Exxon had not been implemented at this particu-
lar station.5 3
42. Id. at 432.
43. 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992).
44. Id. at 457.
45. Id. at 460-61.
46. Id. at 461.
47. Id. at 460.
48. 832 S.W.2d 368, 374 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ granted).
49. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 334 (December 16, 1992).
50. 816 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ granted).
51. Id. at 468.
52. Id.




Mud is mud as a matter of law! A divided Texas Supreme Court so deter-
mined in Brownsville Navigation District v. Izaguirre.5 4 The court held that
ground which becomes soft and muddy when wet is "not a condition which
involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on land" so as to give
rise to a landlord's duty to disclose the condition to the tenant. 5" Izaguirre
was crushed to death when the trailer that he was working in fell over be-
cause the supports sank into the muddy ground causing the cargo to fall on
him. The jury awarded more than two million dollars in damages. The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment on the basis that the lessor failed to warn of
a dangerous condition on the premises unknown to the lessee and because
the lessor breached his duty to warn the lessee of a prior similar accident at
another location.5 6 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment and
noted that a lessor of land is not generally liable to a lessee for physical harm
caused by a dangerous condition that existed when the lessee took posses-
sion. 57 The majority recognized that an exception to the general rule applies
to dangerous conditions that involve unreasonable risk of physical harm if
the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition and the
lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and risk, and has reason
to expect that the lessee would not discover the condition or realize the
risk.58 The majority held this exception not applicable to this case because
what caused the death was the ground itself "which, like most ground,
turned to mud in the rain." 59 The court also rejected the claim that the
district had a duty to warn the lessee about a prior similar accident because
the testimony only reflected personal concerns of one employee and did not
establish a duty by the lessor which it negligently executed. 60
Justice Doggett wrote a spirited dissent in which Justices Mauzy and
Gammage joined. The dissent emphasized that there is no such thing in
Texas as "ordinary dirt."' 6 1 Justice Doggett argued that the proper focus of
the inquiry is not on "ordinary dirt" but rather should be on the unusual
conditions present and the knowledge of the risk that was involved. 62 The
dissent concluded, "with an analysis that is as clear as mud, the majority
once again expresses a preference for second guessing the public spirited citi-
zens who serve as jurors.16 3
Three court of appeals cases have held that retaining control over work or
property can lead to the imposition of a duty. In the first case, Pena v. TXO
Production Corp.,64 the court held that evidence that a general contractor
54. 829 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1992).
55. Id. at 161.
56. 800 S.W.2d at 249-50.
57. 829 S.W.2d at 160.
58. Id. at 161.
59. Id. at 160.
60. Id. at 161.
61. Id. at 162.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 163.
64. 828 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
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supervised an independent contractor's work and gave step-by-step instruc-
tions as to the order of that work, raised a fact issue as to whether the gen-
eral contractor and lessee owed a duty of care to the employee of the
independent contractor.65 The court explained that because the contractor
was in control of the premises and retained control over the independent
contractor's work, it may be liable for injuries caused by its negligent exer-
cise of that control.66
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander67 the plaintiff tripped on an entry
ramp in the parking lot of a Sam's Wholesale Club. Defendant's lease did
not extend beyond the walls of the building, yet they had constructed an
entry ramp without asking for permission from the lessor. The court of ap-
peals held that even though defendant had no duty to maintain the ramp
under the terms of the lease, a legal duty arose to maintain the ramp in a safe
manner since they built the ramp and exercised sufficient control over it.68
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error to consider whether the
evidence of defendant's gross sales was harmful error.69
In the third case, a trustee was held to be liable in Rauch v. Patterson70
because he held legal title and right of possession of the trust property. The
court held that the evidence established the trustee's control of the property
and a duty to the plaintiff as a business invitee. 7'
Whether a party has a duty to warn a licensee of danger was discussed in
two other court of appeals cases. In Peters v. Detsco, Inc.,72 a fireman
brought an action against an independent contractor who performed work
on the premises of a service station where the fireman was injured. In re-
versing the trial court, the court of appeals held that a contractor who has
control of the premises and who has created the danger, has the same duty
to licensees as the owner of the premises.73 In the second case, Smith v.
Andrews,74 the Fort Worth court of appeals held that a plaintiff that had
seen horses and rodeos on television had sufficient knowledge that horses
kick, thus relieving the defendant from the duty to warn him not to go inside
the corral. 75 The defendant had not either expressly or impliedly invited the
plaintiff into the corral, therefore the plaintiff was classified as a licensee. 76
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of
the defendant.
In Baldwin v. Texas Utilities Electric Co. 77 a man drowned while trespass-
65. Id. at 191.
66. Id. at 190.
67. 827 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted).
68. Id. at 422.
69. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1118 (September 9, 1992).
70. 832 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
71. Id. at 59, 60.
72. 820 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
73. Id. at 40.
74. 832 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
75. Id. at 397.
76. Id.
77. 819 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
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ing on property owned by Texas Utilities Electric Company. His parents
sued Texas Utilities alleging that the company was grossly negligent. The
trial court granted summary judgment and the court of appeals affirmed
holding that no genuine issue of fact existed because the land was fenced, it
contained no trespassing and warning signs, and the deceased was a tres-
passer. 78 In short, the court found there was no "want of care" by Texas
Utilities. 79 Likewise in Smither v. Texas Utilities Electric Co. 8 0 the El Paso
court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the utility com-
pany. 8' The court noted that the property was enclosed by a six foot fence
topped with three strands of barbed wire, and no trespassing and danger
signs were posted. Texas Utilities also employed private security guards to
patrol the area, and the decedent was a trespasser. The evidence established
that the defendant was not guilty of negligence.8 2
In another summary judgment case involving a trespasser, a Houston
court of appeals held in Payne v. Cinco Ranch Venture TMC.8 3 that the
defendant's summary judgment evidence did not negate the material issue of
fact as to whether the plaintiff was injured as a result of the defendant's gross
negligence.8 4 Issues remained as to whether an agent of the defendant knew
of the hazard to the plaintiff, and whether a reasonable land owner who
knew the plaintiff swam there would have realized the risk.8 5
The final case on premises liability in this Survey, Haight v. Savoy Apart-
ments,8 6 dealt with an apartment complex's liability for a foreseeable assault.
In this case, a young woman was sexually assaulted and murdered by an
employee of the apartment complex at the complex's swimming pool. The
complex owners had not run a thorough background check on the employee
and were not aware of his prior assault convictions. Additionally, the com-
plex's security personnel did not respond to the late-night, loud, drinking
party at the pool that preceded the assault. The trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the harm to the
victim was not foreseeable and thus the defendant did not have a duty to
protect her. The court of appeals reversed, holding that issues of fact existed
regarding the foreseeability of harm and whether the complex may be liable
if the criminal conduct was a foreseeable result of their negligence.8 7 The
court of appeals expressly rejected the defendant's contention that the as-
sault was not foreseeable because there was no evidence of prior assaults or
crimes on the premises.8 8
78. Id. at 265-66.
79. Id. at 266.
80. 824 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 696.
83. 822 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
84. Id. at 366.
85. Id.
86. 814 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).





The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error in Sewell v. Smith89 to
determine whether the Dram Shop Act 90 provides an intoxicated person
with a cause of action to recover for his own injuries against a seller of alco-
holic beverages. The plaintiff sued the owner of a bar for injuries he sus-
tained in a one-car accident on his way home from the bar. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the bar owner and the court of appeals re-
versed in part, holding that an intoxicated person has a cause of action for
the person's own injuries against the server of alcohol under the Dram Shop
Act.9 1 In this case of first impression, the Dallas court of appeals relied on
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in El Chico Corp. V. P001.92
Further, in Beard v. Graft93 the Texas Supreme Court is considering
whether a social host may be held liable for serving alcohol to intoxicated
guests and allowing them to drive and cause an accident. In this case, Beard
was injured when he was struck by an intoxicated driver who had left the
home of the Graffs. The trial court granted defendant's special exceptions in
which they claimed that Texas law does not allow recovery in social host
liquor liability cases. The court of appeals, sitting en banc, reversed and
remanded for trial on the basis that Texas common law and public policy
support such a cause of action.94 The Texas Supreme Court is currently
considering whether such a cause of action exists in Texas.
G. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Lara v. Lile95 the court of appeals reversed a summary judgment be-
cause the defendant did not establish as a matter of law that the driver who
backed over the decedent was acting as a borrowed servant of another em-
ployer at the time of the accident. 96 The court of appeals reversed summary
judgment for the following reasons: the defendant owned the truck; the de-
fendant's driver was expected to drive the truck that ran over the decedent;
the defendant's employees followed the other employer's directions only
when they entered the job site; and the defendant continued to control them
in their manner of operating and caring for his equipment. 97
II. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - DUTY
Three significant summary judgment cases were decided during the Sur-
89. 819 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ granted).
90. TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 2.03 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
91. 819 S.W.2d at 568.
92. 732 S.W.2d 306, 312 (Tex. 1987).
93. 801 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ granted) (en banc).
94. Id. at 161.
95. 828 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
96. Id. at 540-41.
97. Id. at 540.
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vey period dealing with a doctor's duty to a patient. In Wilson v. Winsett9"
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the court of
appeals affirmed on the basis that no duty of care arose because no physi-
cian-patient relationship ever existed. 99 The decedent was examined by Dr.
Merrill at the request of the Texas Rehabilitation Commission to determine
her rehabilitative potential. The doctor noted a mass in the decedent's lung
in his report to the Commission, but he neither gave the woman a report of
his examination nor informed her of the mass. Four months later another
doctor discovered the mass and the woman died a year later. Relying on
Johnston v. Sibley,' °° the court of appeals held that a doctor who does not
intend to treat or care for a patient and is hired by a third-party, is only
under a duty not to harm the patient because no physician-patient relation-
ship exists.1"" The court of appeals also noted that the outcome might have
been different had the decedent asked the doctor for a copy of the report.'0 2
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ of error to determine whether an
examining physician's duty is violated if the physician fails to inform the
examinee of a life-threatening condition that is revealed by the
examination. 103
Likewise, Wilson, Fought v. Solce' °4 held that in the absence of a doctor-
patient relationship, a doctor has no duty.105 In this case, the plaintiff was
taken to a hospital emergency room after being injured in a motorcycle acci-
dent. The defendant doctor was on call that day but refused to come to the
hospital to treat the plaintiff. The plaintiff's leg was eventually amputated
and he brought suit against the on-call orthopedist alleging that the orthope-
dist refused to treat him because he had no proof of medical insurance. The
court of appeals noted that no doctor-patient relationship existed between
the parties and that the fact that the doctor was voluntarily on call did not in
itself impose a duty because he was not required to be on call in order to
maintain privileges at the hospital. 106 The plaintiff also alleged that the doc-
tor's refusal to treat him constituted negligence per se because the doctor
violated former article 4438a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 10 7 In af-
firming the trial court's summary judgment, the court of appeals noted that
the legislature did not intend the act to impose liability on a doctor who
failed to respond to a phone call requesting him to go to a hospital and treat
a person he did not know.108
In Owens v. Litton '0 9 the court of appeals reversed the trial court's sum-
98. 828 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, writ granted).
99. Id. at 233.
100. 558 S.W.2d 135, 137-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
101. Wilson, 828 S.W.2d at 233.
102. Id.
103. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1118 (Sept. 12, 1992).
104. 821 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
105. Id. at 220.
106. Id.
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4438a (Vernon 1986).
108. Id. at 221.
109. 822 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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mary judgment, finding a fact question existed as to whether the defendant
had a right of control rather than actual control, which imposed a duty to
the patient."10 Further, the court of appeals held that the defendant's sum-
mary judgment proof failed to establish as a matter of law that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against him.II1
B. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - STANDARD OF CARE
Several summary judgment cases decided during the Survey period illus-
trated the need to prove the standard of care in medical negligence cases. In
Gonzales v. Outlar 12 the court of appeals overturned a summary judgment
in favor of the physician. Relying on Evans v. Conley,' 1 3 the court held that
to obtain a summary judgment, the movant must conclusively establish the
standard of care and that the treatment was within that standard.' 1 4 The
court reasoned that the physician's affidavit did not provide any measure-
ment by which a trier of fact could determine if the specific medical proce-
dures and techniques used met the standard of care. 1 5 Conversely, in
Rinando v. Stern'1 6 the court of appeals held that a hypothetical question
not based on direct evidence is insufficient to raise a question of fact as to
whether a doctor violated the standard of care.' 7 In affirming the summary
judgment in favor of the doctor, the court of appeals reasoned that the doc-
tor's evidence was sufficient to establish a standard of care and the plaintiff
failed to tender any controverting evidence as to whether the doctor violated
that standard.' 1 8
C. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - LACK OF INFORMED CONSENT
In Johnston v. Vilardi' 9 the court held that a cause of action based on
negligence and a cause of action based on lack of informed consent are sepa-
rate and distinct.1 20 The court reasoned that the doctor's own evidence
presented a factual dispute on a material issue in the informed consent cause
of action. 1 21 Yet, the doctor did meet his burden in establishing that he met
the standard of care in the negligence action. Thus, the court of appeals
affirmed summary judgment with regards to the negligence cause of action,
but reversed and remanded the lack of informed consent cause of action.
In Melissinos v. Phamanivong 22 the Texarkana court of appeals upheld
the trial court's definition of informed consent and stated that the case was
110. Id. at 797.
Ill. Id.
112. 829 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
113. 787 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
114. Gonzales, 829 S.W.2d at 934.
115. Id.
116. 831 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
117. Id. at 463.
118. Id. at 462.
119. 817 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
120. Id. at 797.
121. Id.
122. 823 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied).
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properly submitted to the jury on the issues of lack of informed consent and
fraud.' 23 The court held that because there were misrepresentations in this
case as well as a failure to disclose, the trial court was correct in submitting
to the jury broad-formed questions based on common law fraud since the
definition of informed consent does not include misrepresentations. 24
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. DuTY
In General Motors Corp. v. Saenz 125 the Corpus Christi court of appeals
held that the subsequent modification of a truck manufactured by G.M. did
not relieve G.M. from liability for failing to warn against overloading the
truck.' 26 The court reasoned that since the truck was sold without a body,
modifications were intended and foreseeable.' 27 As such, the manufacturer
has a duty to warn the customers not to alter the product in a foreseeably
dangerous manner. 1 28 In this case, the truck was sold to a buyer who used it
for towing trucks for fifteen years. The second buyer placed a 2,000 gallon
water tank on the chassis and made other modifications. The third buyer
filled the water tank so that the gross vehicle weight was exceeded, which
caused the tires to blow out killing both the driver and passenger. The court
distinguished this case from other Texas and federal cases in which the
courts relieved the original manufacturers of responsibility for dangers
caused by modifications to vehicles by second stage manufacturers.1 29 The
court explained that these modifications to the truck were not only foresee-
able, but expected, which required an adequate warning regarding loading
for virtually every foreseeably modification.130 The court noted that since
the evidence showed that it was foreseeable that overloading the truck could
cause injuries, G.M. had a duty to provide an adequate warning to all users
not to exceed the appropriate weight limits.13 1 The Texas Supreme Court
has granted writ on the issue of G.M.'s duty to warn and as to whether that
failure to warn was a proximate cause or producing cause of the accident. 1 32
Two other cases held that the reseller did not have a duty to warn because
the risk of injury was not foreseeable. In USX Corp. v. Salinas133 the court
held that a product supplier is not liable for a failure to warn of unforesee-
able dangers that exist at the time the product was marketed; in those cases,
the plaintiff must show that the product supplier knew or should have
123. Id. at 344.
124. Id.




129. See Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir. 1978); Trevino v. Yamaha Mo-
tor Co., 882 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1989); Elliott v. Century Chevrolet Co., 597 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980, writ ref n.r.e.).
130. 829 S.W.2d at 235.
131. Id. at 240.
132. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 137 (Nov. 4, 1992).
133. 818 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
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known of the risks at the time of marketing.' 34 The court noted that in a
marketing defect case, "the four types of dangers which require a warning
are: (1) a risk of danger inherent in the design of a product; (2) foreseeable
dangers or risk of harm from unintended uses of a product; (3) risks of dan-
gers that affect only a limited number of users susceptible to a danger in the
product; and (4) unavoidably unsafe products."' 135 Relying on Aluminum
Co. ofAmerica v. ALM, 36 the court held that the plaintiff had the burden to
prove the downstream retailer knew or should have known of the risks at the
time of marketing. 137 By failing to introduce factually sufficient evidence on
this point, the plaintiff did not establish that defendant owed any duty. 138
In Schmidt v. Centex Beverage, Inc. 139 the plaintiff sued a wholesale beer
distributor for injuries he suffered from allegedly intoxicated volunteers at a
music festival. Schmidt had trespassed into a musical festival and was in-
jured by the festival volunteers who the beer wholesaler knew would receive
free beer from the promoter. Schmidt argued that the wholesale beer distrib-
utor had a duty to warn consumers of the effects of intoxication. Relying on
Joseph E Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. McGuire,14 the court held the effects of
alcohol consumption are within the common-knowledge exception to strict
liability and that Centex had no duty to warn.' 4 ' The Schmidt court distin-
guished this case from Brune v. Brown Forman Corp. 142 which held that
acute alcohol poisoning did not fall within the common-knowledge excep-
tion because the dangers of acute alcohol poisoning are extreme and are not
commonly known.' 43
B. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group'44 the United States Supreme Court held
that the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 does preempt claims
based on cigarette manufacturer's failure to warn. 145 However, the Court
also held that the 1969 Act does not preempt claims based on express war-
ranty, intentional fraud, misrepresentation based on fraudulent claims and
advertisements, or conspiracy to misrepresent or conceal material facts. 146
In this case, the plaintiff contracted lung cancer after many years of smoking
cigarettes and sued the cigarette manufacturers for breach of express war-
ranties in their advertising, failure to warn consumers about the hazards of
134. Id. at 483.
135. Id.
136. 785 S.W. 137 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 847 (1990).
137. USX Corp., 818 S.W. 2d at 483.
138. Id. at 487.
139. 825 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
140. 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991) (which held that manufacturers of alcoholic beverages
have no duty to warn consumers of the dangers of chronic alcoholism because such dangers
are commonly known).
141. Schmidt, 825 S.W.2d at 794.
142. 758 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
143. Id. at 831.
144. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
145. Id. at 2621-22.
146. Id. at 2622-24.
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smoking, fraudulently misrepresenting those hazards to consumers, and con-
spiring to deprive the public of medical and scientific information about
smoking. The Court held that the claim based on breach of express war-
ranty was not preempted because it rests on a duty voluntarily undertaken
by advertising, rather than a duty imposed under state law.147 The Court
held that the failure to warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims are
preempted due to the effect of federally mandated warning labels. 148 On the
other hand, the Court held that the claim based on allegedly fraudulent
statements in the defendant's advertisements as well as a conspiracy claim
were not preempted. 49
Like Cipollone, Texas courts have also recognized that state causes of ac-
tion may exist despite the presence of federal statutes or standards promul-
gated in the area or field. In Carlisle v. Phillip Morris, Inc. 150 cigarette
smokers and their families sued several cigarette manufacturers, wholesalers
and industry representatives under Texas state law theories of failure to
warn, design defects, manufacturing defects, misrepresentations and civil
conspiracy. The trial court granted the tobacco industry's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the federal act preempted all claims
asserted by the plaintiffs. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the
cause for trial on the grounds that none of the claims were preempted.' 5'
After contemplating this issue for over a year, the Texas Supreme Court
denied the tobacco industry's application for writ of error, thereby allowing
the case to be remanded for trial on the state law causes of action against the
tobacco industry. 52
The San Antonio court of appeals in Macmillan v. Redman Homes,
Inc. '53 held that federal standards did not preempt a state cause of action
against repairers of mobile homes.' 54 The plaintiffs bought a used mobile
home which had been repossessed from the original owner and repaired.
They alleged that the home was unsafe due to excessive levels of formalde-
hyde gas. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to state a cause of
action which would allow recovery. The court of appeals reversed the trial
court on the grounds that federal safety standards did not apply to actions
for improper repair of used mobile homes; neither the language of the act
nor federal policy would prohibit the application of state law to actions
against repairmen. 55
147. Id. at 2622-23.
148. Id. at 2623.
149. Id. at 2623-24.
150. 805 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
151. Id. at 517.
152. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 192 (November 18, 1992).
153. 818 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).





Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Lee' 56 reaffirmed the rule stated in Varela v.
American Petrofina Co. 157 which holds that evidence of an employer's con-
tributory negligence is inadmissible in a suit by an employee against a third-
party manufacturer.1 58 The plaintiff in Dresser contracted silicosis, a lung
disease, after working for Tyler Pipe Industries for eight years. The plaintiff
brought a third-party suit against the company that manufactured the silica,
and the case was submitted to the jury on a strict liability theory. The jury
found that Dresser's failure to warn of the danger rendered the silica unrea-
sonably dangerous as marketed. 159 The court of appeals affirmed and held
that the trial court properly excluded evidence regarding the employer's con-
duct to support the defendant manufacturer's sole cause defense and prop-
erly denied the sole cause instruction.160 The court of appeals also held that
"contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negli-
gence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to
guard against the possibility of its existence."' 6' The Texas Supreme Court
has granted writ of error to consider whether the failure to give a sole cause
instruction or to exclude that evidence relating to the contributory negli-
gence issue was harmful error.' 62
Karisch v. Allied-Signal, Inc. 163 and Johnson v. Machine Ice Co. 164 both
discussed whether equipment was an improvement to realty or a component
part which in turn determined whether the ten year statute of repose applied
or the two year statute of limitation. In Karisch, the Corpus Christi court of
appeals determined that a heat exchanger installed in an oil refinery was an
improvement to realty rather than a component part, and thus the ten year
statute of repose applied.' 65 The court of appeals reasoned that since the
heat exchanger was large in size, was difficult to move, and had been in
continuous use and existence in the same place for twenty-two years, it was
an improvement to the realty. 166 Yet in Johnson, a Houston court of appeals
reversed summary judgment holding that a fact issue existed as to whether
the equipment was a component part since the item could be moved. 167
Hernandez v. American Appliance Manufacturing Corp. 168 was a wrongful
death case where the court of appeals upheld the jury's findings that the
156. 821 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, writ granted).
157. 658 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. 1983).
158. Id. at 562.
159. Dresser, 821 S.W.2d at 407.
160. Id. at 408.
161. Id. at 407-08 (quoting McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex.
1967)).
162. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1129 (Sept. 16, 1992).
163. 837 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
164. 820 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1991, writ denied).
165. Karisch, 837 S.W.2d at 681; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009(a)
(Vernon 1986).
166. 837 S.W.2d at 681.
167. Johnson, 820 S.W.2d at 852-53.
168. 827 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
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deceased was ninety percent negligent.169 The deceased was fatally injured
when the pilot light of a water heater ignited the vapors of the adhesive glue
he was working with. The court of appeals reasoned that the evidence sup-
ported the finding that the decedent knew he was taking a risk by using
adhesives near a water heater without extinguishing the pilot light. °70 The
court of appeals distinguished this case because it involved a patent defect
known to the decedent as opposed to those cases involving latent defects not
known to plaintiffs. 17 1
Finally, in Anderson v. Hodge Boats & Motors, Inc. 172 the Beaumont court
of appeals held that a defendant corporation that had been dissolved before
the accident, and more than three years before the suit was filed, was entitled
to summary judgment. 73 The court held that this case did not violate the
open court's doctrine because a post dissolution claim has never been recog-
nized in Texas and no statutory grant of such relief exists. 174
D. EVIDENTIARY MATrERS
In Cantrell v. Hennessy Industries, Inc. 175 the Tyler court of appeals held
that the trial court committed reversible error by limiting plaintiff's discov-
ery to only those documents relating to the same model machine that caused
the injury. 176 In this products liability case involving a tire changing
machine, the plaintiff alleged that a pressure-limiting device was technologi-
cally available years before the tire changing machine was manufactured.
The trial court, however, limited discovery to documents regarding the same
model of machine with the same manufacture date or within five years prior
to it, thus excluding evidence of pressure-limiting devices used on other tire-
changing machines made by the same manufacturer. Since the issue of
whether a safer design is suitable for one machine and adaptable to another
is a question of feasibility to be decided by the jury, such discovery was
relevant and the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting it.' 77
In a unanimous decision, the Texas Supreme Court in Lear Siegler, Inc. v.
Perez178 held that a worker's death was too remotely connected to any prod-
uct defect to constitute a cause of action against its manufacturer. 179 In this
case, a sleeping driver hit a flashing mobile traffic sign which killed a high-
way worker. The worker's family sued the mobile sign manufacturer alleg-
ing that the sign had malfunctioned at the time of the accident as it had done
previously that day. There was no evidence that the signal would have
alerted a driver who was asleep. The court recognized there may be cases in
169. Id. at 385.
170. Id. at 391.
171. Id. at 392; see Keen v. Ashot Ashkelon, Ltd., 748 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1988).
172. 814 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
173. Id. at 896.
174. Id.; see TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
175. 829 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ denied).
176. Id. at 877.
177. Id.
178. 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991).
179. Id. at 472.
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which a product defect exposes another to an increased risk of harm, but
concluded the circumstances in this case were too attenuated and thus sum-
mary judgment was proper.180
IV. DAMAGES
A. ACTUAL DAMAGES
In Hill v. Clayton 81 the Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed an
award of $2,500.00 for physical pain and mental anguish, medical care, loss
of earning capacity, physical impairment, and disfigurement resulting from a
gunshot wound apparently because the award was against the great weight
and preponderance of the evidence.1 82 The plaintiff had introduced uncon-
troverted expert testimony that the reasonable and necessary medical ex-
penses resulting from the shooting were $8,939.00. The jury awarded the
plaintiff $2,500.00 in damages and apportioned liability equally between the
plaintiff and defendant. Although the amount of damages to be awarded is
left to the sound discretion of the jury, the court of appeals concluded that
"the jury cannot ignore the undisputed facts and arbitrarily fix an amount
that is neither authorized nor supported by the evidence. 1 83
In a personal injury case, future damages are within the jury's province to
resolve.184 Relying on Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Dryden,18 5 the Fort Worth
court of appeals in Pipgrass v. Hart1 86 held that a large jury award does not
indicate an improper award, since future damages of lost earning capacity
may be based on common knowledge and a sense of justice. 187 The court of
appeals reasoned that "no precise evidence is required to support an award
of future medical damages, and a jury may base an award upon the nature of
the injuries incurred together with the medical treatment rendered, and the
injured party's condition at trial."1 88 In this case, although there was no
direct evidence of the injury's effect on the plaintiff's future income and fu-
ture medical costs, the court of appeals affirmed the award of substantial
future damages.189
B. MENTAL ANGUISH
Hyler v. Boytor190 was a personal injury case in which the jury awarded
the plaintiff damages for past loss of earning capacity, past physical impair-
ment, and past and future medical expenses, but did not award damages for
180. Id.
181. 827 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, n.w.h.).
182. Id. at 574.
183. Id.; see Gray v. Floyd, 783 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no
writ); Clark v. Brewer, 471 S.W.2d 639, 642 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no writ).
184. Pipgrass v. Hart, 832 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
185. 735 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, no writ).
186. 832 S.W.2d 360.
187. Id. at 366.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 363.
190. 823 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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pain and suffering or mental anguish. 19' The plaintiff appealed arguing that
the jury's award of no damages for physical pain and mental anguish was
manifestly unjust and against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence and that such damages were established as a matter of law. The court
of appeals affirmed, relying on Blizzard v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 192 which distinguished between subjective injuries and objective inju-
ries. 193 The court concluded that the jury award of zero damages must be
upheld if the indicia of injury is more subjective than objective. 194 The hold-
ing in this case suggests that when the evidence of injury is subjective, a
jury's award of zero damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish will
be upheld. If the evidence supporting an injury is objective, then a jury's
award of zero damages will be against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence.
Similarly, the El Paso court of appeals held in Worsham Steel Co. v.
Arias'95 that evidence to support a wrongfully discharged employee's claim
for mental anguish was factually insufficient. 196 The employee brought suit
alleging he was wrongfully discharged for asserting a worker's compensation
claim. The jury awarded him $1,243,000 in both actual and exemplary dam-
ages. 197 The court of appeals reversed, stating that a recovery for mental
anguish "is warranted in such cases where the plaintiff's mental pain has
risen to such a level that it has rendered him incapable of dealing with cer-
tain everyday activities."' 198 The court reasoned that although the evidence
showed that the plaintiff was "very sad", there was no evidence of pain,
distress, anguish, grief, or the like which would support an award for mental
anguish. 199
In a suit for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
mental anguish arising from a wrongful foreclosure and eviction, the El Paso
court of appeals upheld the jury's findings in LaCoure v. LaCoure.2° ° In
LaCoure, the wife was awarded sole possession of a house when the couple
divorced.20 ' The husband's father wrongfully evicted the wife based on the
husband's default on a backdated note and deed of trust that had been filed
after the divorce. The court of appeals found sufficient evidence that the
father engaged in intentional or reckless conduct that was extreme and out-
rageous and caused the wife severe mental distress.20 2 The court reasoned
that because there were no objective standards to measure mental anguish
damages, the amount of such damages should be left to the jury's
191. Id.
192. 756 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
193. 823 S.W.2d at 427.
194. Id. at 428.
195. 831 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
196. Id. at 87.
197. Id. at 82.
198. Id. at 86.
199. Id. at 87.
200. 820 S.W.2d 228 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
201. Id. at 232.




The Supreme Court of Texas, in Boyles v. Kerr,2°4 held that Texas law
does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. This highly publicized case was based upon a videotape made without
Ms. Kerr's knowledge, which showed her engaging in sexual intercourse
with Mr. Boyles. At trial, the jury awarded Ms. Kerr monetary damages
and the court of appeals affirmed. 205 The Texas Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial reasoning that Kerr could not recover
based on the jury verdict because
the tort system can and does provide a remedy against those who en-
gage in such conduct. But an independent cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress would encompass conduct far less outra-
geous than that involved here, and such a broad tort is not necessary to
allow compensation in a truly egregious case such as this.206
Boyles overruled St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard,207 which recognized an
independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The
Texas Supreme Court further held that it was not limiting the right to re-
cover mental anguish damages in other contexts such as a breach of some
other duty imposed by law.208
The El Paso court of appeals, in Crites v. Peitila,2°9 held that parents have
a common law negligence claim for mental anguish damages based on the
death of a fetus. In this case, the mother was eight months pregnant when
she was involved in a car accident. After being treated for injuries, the
mother was released from the hospital. The next day she visited her obstetri-
cian. There she was given a sonogram, which determined the baby was
dead. The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctors, and the
parents appealed. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial hold-
ing Texas law recognizes such a claim for mental anguish. 210
More recently, the Dallas court of appeals in Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell21'
held that mental anguish damages are not recoverable by a person who is not
a bystander. Terry Tidwell was shot while working at a gas station. His
mother arrived shortly after the shooting and saw him in the ambulance.
Terry and his mother sued Exxon and obtained a judgment against Exxon
that included mental anguish damages for the mother. The appellate court
denied recovery for mental anguish of a non-bystander. Tidwell argued on
appeal that since bystander status was not necessary for recovery in a claim
for loss of consortium, nor was it necessary for recovery in a claim for negli-
gent infliction of emotion distress. The court rejected the argument because
203. Id. at 234.
204. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231 (Dec. 5, 1992).
205. 806 S.W.2d 255, 261 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991), rev'd, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231
(Dec. 5, 1992).
206. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 237.
207. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
208. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 235-238 (Dec. 5, 1992).
209. 826 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, n.w.h.).
210. Id.
211. 816 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ granted).
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a claim for loss of consortium does not include an element of mental
anguish. 212
C. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
The El Paso court of appeals, in Goswami v. Thetford,21 3 held that a puni-
tive damage award of $95,000.00 was not excessive even though the actual
damages were $5,000.00.214 Goswami was a sexual harassment and assault
case in which a new employee was subjected to unwanted sexual advances,
including kissing and touching. The jury found that the defendant's conduct
was extreme and outrageous, and awarded the punitive damages. The court
stated that the purpose of exemplary damages is to deter the wrongdoer and
prevent future harms of the same nature. When a jury honestly tries to set
an amount which punishes a wrongdoer, and does not oppress him, the judg-
ment should not be disturbed by the appellate courts. 215 The court reasoned
that whether the amount is excessive is a question of fact and depends on the
surrounding circumstances of each case and will be set aside only if the evi-
dence indicates that the exemplary damages were the result of passion or
prejudice or that the evidence had been disregarded by jury.216 The court
held that the punitive damages, which were nineteen times the amount of the
actual damages, were not excessive because the defendants' conduct was of
such a nature that our society has rightfully moved to denounce them.217
In Transmission Exchange, Inc. v. Long218 a customer sued an automobile
transmission repair shop alleging fraud and deceptive practices. The trial
court entered judgment for the customer in the amount of $512.00 actual
damages and $30,000.00 punitive damages.219 The repair shop argued on
appeal that the award of punitive damages was improper because evidence
was insufficient.220 The court applied the facts of this case to Chapter 41 of
the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code,221 which expressly puts no
limit on exemplary damages resulting from an intentional tort.222 Since this
case was an action for fraud, an intentional tort, the court reviewed the
award under the principals of common law.223 The court found that the
evidence was sufficient and upheld the award of punitive damages. 22 4
In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Morie22 5 however, the Texas Supreme
Court granted writ to consider an exemplary award of $1,000,000.00. The
212. Id. (relying on Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1990)).
213. 829 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
214. Id. at 318.
215. Id. at 321.
216. Id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v Joseph, 769 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ)).
217. Id.
218. 821 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
219. Id. at 268.
220. Id. at 272.
221. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE, Chapter 41 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
222. Id. § 41.008.
223. 821 S.W.2d at 272.
224. Id. at 273.
225. 814 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ granted).
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court will consider whether the punitive damages in this worker's compensa-
tion case violated Chapter 41 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
and whether the award violates the due process clauses of the United States
and Texas Constitutions.226
In Transportation Insurance the insurance carrier contended that Texas
law on punitive damages is impermissibly vague and thus violates their due
process rights regarding a punitive damages award. The appeals court af-
firmed the judgment, relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,227 which set forth factors to be
considered by the courts in reviewing punitive damages awards. 228 Simi-
larly, the court of appeals, in Texas Employers Insurance Association v.
Puckett,229 reasoned that since jury instructions expressly described the pur-
pose of punitive damages and also listed factors the jury could consider in
determining the amount of such damages, then under either Texas law or the
Haslip decision, a carrier's due process rights were not violated. 230
D. PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST
The Fort Worth court of appeals, in General Life & Accident Insurance
Co. v. Higginbotham,231 upheld a pre-judgment interest award of six percent
per year on trebled damages due under an insurance contract. 232 According
to Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated article 5069-1.05, a rate of ten
percent per year applies to mental anguish damages when an insurance con-
tract does not set a formula by which that sum can be ascertained with rea-
sonable certainty. 233 The court explains that the six percent rate provided
for in Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated art. 5069-1.03 applies to
amounts due under the policy and the statutory trebling of those
damages.234
V. CONTRIBUTION, INDEMNITY, AND SETTLEMENT
In Shoemake v. Fogel, Ltd. ,235 the Texas Supreme Court held that a claim
for contribution against the parent by the defendant is barred by the doctrine
of parental immunity.236 In this case, the child nearly drowned in a swim-
ming pool at her apartment complex, but was rescued and temporarily re-
vived only to die four months later from the injuries. The mother brought
an action in her own capacity against the apartment complex for wrongful
death and a survival action in her capacity as representative of the child's
226. Id.
227. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
228. Id. at 1044-46.
229. 822 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
230. Id. at 142.
231. 817 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1991, writ denied); see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon 1987).
232. Id. at 833-34.
233. Id. at 834 (relying on TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon 1987)).
234. Id.
235. 826 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1992).
236. Id. at 935.
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estate. Considering the negligence that caused the death, the jury attributed
fifty-five percent to the apartment and the remaining forty-five percent to the
mother.237 In the wrongful death action, the trial court reduced the
mother's recovery by forty-five percent, yet rendered judgment on their sur-
vival action in the full amount of the jury verdict.238 Relying on Felderhoff
v. Felderhoff239 and Jilani v. Jilani,240 the court in Shoemake held that pa-
rental immunity does not extend to suits arising in the course of the parent's
business activities or to automobile tort actions. 241 In cases involving the
management, supervision and control of a minor, the defense of parental
immunity is preserved even if it is not specifically pled because such a de-
fense is apparent on the face of the petition and is established as a matter of
law.242 Since the minor's cause of action against her parent is barred by the
doctrine of parental immunity, the apartment complex, which was a joint
tortfeasor, had no right to contribution against the mother. 243
The San Antonio court of appeals in USX Corporation v. Salinas244 held
that where there is no evidence that a retailer was independently culpable
with respect to the product in question, the retailer is entitled to indemnity
from the wholesale distributor and manufacturer of an oil rig elevator.245
The court reasoned that while the common law doctrine of indemnity be-
tween joint tortfeasors in strict liability cases was implicitly abolished in
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,246 an indemnity right survives in product
liability cases to protect the innocent retailer in the chain of distribution. 247
Since the record did not show any evidence that USX was independently
culpable, then as an innocent retailer USX was entitled to indemnity. 248
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court decided two cases
which addressed the various contribution and comparative causation
schemes in Texas. In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling249 a developer
bought a tract of land to develop a residential subdivision and received as-
surances from the seller, the attorneys, and the title company that three im-
proved lots were included in the sale. After the sale, the developer learned
that he had not received good title to the three improved homesites. The
developer brought suit for violations of the Insurance Code, DTPA, negli-
gence, gross negligence, and fraud.250 The seller and attorneys settled for
$400,000, and the case proceeded against the title company alone. The jury
awarded the developer $200,000 in actual and consequential damages, find-
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 463 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971).
240. 767 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1988).
241. 826 S.W.2d 933, 935.
242. Id. at 937.
243. Id. at 938.
244. 818 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
245. Id. at 489-90.
246. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
247. 818 S.W.2d at 489.
248. Id. at 490.
249. 822 S.W.2d I (Tex. 1991), modified, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 316 (Dec. 11, 1991).
250. Id. at 4.
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ing that the title company knowingly engaged in improper trade practices.25'
The developer elected to recover under the insurance code, trebling the dam-
age award. The court of appeals revived the "one satisfaction rule" of Brad-
shaw v. Baylor University252 and permitted the title company to receive a
dollar for dollar credit 253 under the original contribution statute.254 The
court stated that this rule would be applied only when there is one indivisible
harm and that since the developer suffered the single injury of failure to
obtain good title, then the trebled award of $600,000 should be offset by the
$400,000 paid in settlement. 25  The court applied a post trebling credit to
give effect to the clear punitive purpose of the penal provisions. 2 6 Justice
Doggett, joined by Justices Mauzy and Gammage, wrote a dissent arguing
that the majority had awakened a "dead tort principle to roam the land
terrorizing victims." '257 The dissent argued that the one satisfaction rule es-
poused in Bradshaw had previously been pronounced dead in Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co. 258 The dissent further mourned that the majority's deci-
sion confers a windfall to wrongdoers, discourages settlement and "[a]s in
The Night of the Living Dead, an unthinkable zombie is raised to prey on
the living." 259
In Gold Kist, Inc. v. Texas Utilities Electric Co.,260 Texas Utilities re-
quested a dollar for dollar credit for the amount paid by the other settling
defendant. 261 The trial court rejected Texas Utilities' dollar for dollar credit
election and applied a proportional reduction of Texas Utilities' liability. 262
The court of appeals held that Texas Utilities was entitled to a dollar for
dollar credit.263 The supreme court reversed holding that this case was gov-
erned by the pre-1987 comparative negligence statute.264 The supreme court
reasoned that nothing in the pre-1987 statute gave the non-settling defendant
the exclusive right to elect the type of credit it receives, and the credit is
determined solely by the submission of the settling defendant's negligence to
the jury regardless of who requests the submission.265 Relying on Duncan
the court noted that both the benefits and the risks of settlement should rest
with the plaintiff.266
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court has abolished Mary Carter agreements.
251. Id.
252. 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935).
253. 822 S.W.2d at 5-6.
254. Id. (discussing TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 32.001).
255. Id. at 9.
256. Id.
257. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Tex. 1991) (Doggett, J.,
dissenting).
258. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
259. 822 S.W.2d at 12.
260. 830 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. 1992).
261. Id. at 92.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 93-94 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 33.014 and 33.015).




In Elbaor v. Smith267 the court announced that Mary Carter agreements are
void as against public policy.268 The court stated that a Mary Carter agree-
ment exists when the settling defendant retains a financial stake in the plain-
tiff's recovery and remains a party at the trial of the case.269 The court
reasoned that Mary Carter agreements inflict both procedural and substan-
tive damage upon our adversarial system and violate sound public policy. 27 0
The court went on to say that this holding was applicable only to this case,
those cases "in the judicial pipeline where error has been preserved," and to
those actions tried on or after December 2, 1992.271 The court concluded
that a settling defendant may not participate in the trial in which he retains a
financial interest in the plaintiff's lawsuit. 272
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND REPOSE
A. WRONGFUL DEATH AND NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
The Texas Supreme Court held that a wrongful death cause of action, filed
thirty-six days after the plaintiff died, was barred by the statute of limitations
in Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.273 The decedent was diagnosed with
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease caused by exposure to silica during
his employment as a sandblaster. In 1982, he sued several defendants in-
volved in the manufacturing and distribution of the product he used during
his employment. Five weeks after the decedent died in 1988, his widow and
children amended his petition, adding their wrongful death claims and ad-
ding seven new defendants. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed summary
judgment as to the new defendants on the grounds that the claims were
barred by the statute of limitations.274 The court reasoned that limitations
for wrongful death cases begin to run when the fact of the injury is known,
regardless of whether the plaintiff has actually died.275 Thus, the widow's
and children's wrongful death cause of action against those defendants ad-
ded after Russell's death were barred by limitations. 276 In order to file a
timely wrongful death cause of action, Russell would have had to file all
claims against any defendants within two years of the date that the fact of
injury is known.277
When multiple actions are based on the same wrongful conduct and an
individual's action for personal injuries would have been barred by limita-
tions at the time of his death, then actions brought by his heirs or estate






273. 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 352.
277. Id. at 344 n.3; see also Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. 1990)
(discussing the discovery rule).
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under the survival statute278 and by his beneficiaries under the wrongful
death statute279 are also barred by limitations.280 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court reasoned that since a decedent's actions would have been
barred by limitations had it been asserted immediately prior to his death, all
derivative claims based on he same alleged wrong is likewise barred.281 The
court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a wrongful death action does not
accrue until the death of the injured person under Section 16.003(b) of the
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code.28 2 The court reasoned that this section applies if a
wrongful death action exists, but if a wrongful death action does not exist
because the decedent could not maintain an action in his own right immedi-
ately prior to his death, then no wrongful death action ever accrues. 283
In Flores v. Lively284 the Corpus Christi court of appeals held that a wife's
cause of action against her husband for negligent transmission of genital
herpes accrued when she became aware that she had the disease.285 The
couple were married in 1981, and in 1982 Flores was diagnosed with genital
herpes. Lively was diagnosed with the disease in 1983, and in 1989 they
divorced. Flores argued that the trial court erred in entering judgment in
favor of Lively because her claim is barred by limitation. The court of ap-
peals agreed holding that Lively's cause of action accrued when she became
aware that she had the disease, in 1983.286 Lively argued that her cause of
action did not begin to accrue until 1987, when the Texas Supreme Court
abolished the common law defense of interspousal immunity in Price v.
Price.287 The court of appeals rejected this argument reasoning that Price
"did not create a new cause of action; it abolished a defense". 288
B. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Rowntree v. Hunsucker289 a patient and her husband brought a medical
malpractice suit against a physician for failing to diagnose an injury causing
condition. On October 24, 1985, Dr. Rowntree examined the plaintiff and
prescribed medication for hypertension. Throughout the next two years,
plaintiff had her blood pressure checked by Dr. Rowntree's nurses. On May
22, 1987 plaintiff telephoned, requesting a refill of her hypertension medica-
tion. She did not express any complaints or receive any medical advice at
that time. She was given a prescription authorizing five refills or a six month
supply. On January 5, 1988, plaintiff suffered a debilitating stroke due to an
occluded carotid artery. In October 1989 the plaintiff sued Dr. Rowntree for
278. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.021 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
279. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 71.001-011 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
280. 841 S.W.2d at 343.
281. Id. at 345.
282. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(b) (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1993).
283. 841 S.W.2d at 350.
284. 818 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
285. Id. at 462.
286. Id.
287. 732 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. 1987).
288. 818 S.W.2d at 462.
289. 833 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1992).
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negligently failing to diagnose, monitor and otherwise properly treat the oc-
cluded artery.
The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis of limitations and
the Texas Supreme Court affirmed.290 The limitations begin to run on "(1)
the occurrence of the breach or tort; (2) the date the health care treatment
that is the subject of the claim is completed; or (3) the date the hospitaliza-
tion for which the claim is made is completed."'291 The statute of limitations
begins to run on the precise date of the specific breach or tort, if it is ascer-
tainable from the facts of the case. 292 If the " 'injury occurs during a course
of treatment for a particular condition and the only readily ascertainable
date is the last day of treatment,'" then the statute of limitation begins to
run on that date.293 If the course of a drug treatment is the direct cause of
the injury, the period begins to run on the date of the last drug treatment.294
Similarly, if the defendant instituted an improper course of treatment based
on misdiagnosis, the statute begins to run on the last date of the
treatment. 295
In Rowntree, the Texas Supreme Court could not determine as a matter of
law that the ongoing treatment for high blood pressure was not treatment for
the condition that was the basis of plaintiffs' claim. 29 6 Accordingly, the stat-
ute of limitations began to run on the date of the patient's last visit to the
doctor's office, not the date of last prescription refill for high blood
pressure. 297
In Conaway v. Chambers298 the Texarkana court of appeals reversed the
trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the doctor. In
this case, the doctor performed a breast examination and a mammography in
June of 1986 and found no cancerous condition. That was the last date that
the patient saw the doctor for her breast condition. Over the past two years,
however, the doctor saw the patient on at least six occasions for unrelated
visits. In May 1988, the plaintiff was diagnosed with breast cancer and a
mastectomy was performed a week later. The patient filed suit in January,
1989.
The court of appeals reversed summary judgment on the ground that a
material issue of fact existed as to whether the doctor was still treating the
patient for the breast condition at the time of her later office visits. 299 In the
event that a wrongful act is of a continuing nature, a plaintiff "has a new
cause of action each time a wrongful act occurs. ' ' 300 Accordingly, the limi-
290. Id.
291. Id. at 104 (citing Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. 1987)).
292. Id. at 105 (citing Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372).
293. Id. (quoting Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372).
294. Id.
295. Id. (citing Kimball, 741 S.W.2d at 372).
296. Id. at 106-8.
297. Id. at 108.
298. 823 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ granted).
299. Id. at 335.
300. Id. at 334.
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tation period begins to run when each wrongful act occurs. 30 1
In Parker v. Yen 302 the plaintiff sued a pharmacist and pharmacy for mis-
filling a prescription with the wrong medicine. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for both defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The court of
appeals held that material issues of fact exist as to when consumers knew or
should have known of alleged deceptive acts giving rise to breach of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act;30 3 the limitation was tolled on the
medical malpractice claim against the pharmacist by giving written notice
pursuant to Article 4590(i) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes;304 and the
negligence action for personal injuries accrued on the date the customer was
injured as a result of ingesting the misfilled prescriptions. 30 5
Finally, in Gandara v. Slade306 the Austin court of appeals held that a
doctor is not entitled to summary judgment based on the two year statute of
limitations 30 7 when material issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiffs or
the deceased knew or reasonably should have known of the doctor's negli-
gence more than two years before the suit was filed. 30 8 The court reasoned
that application of the two year statute of limitations in this case violated the
open court's provision of the Texas Constitution 3°9 by foreclosing the plain-
tiff's cause of action before they should have known it existed. The deceased
was examined by the doctor in April 1985. In August 1988, she was notified
that the blood donor from whom she had received blood during surgeries
had the HIV antibody. She died from AIDS in January 1990. Her parents
sued the doctor in February, 1991 alleging that he was negligent in April,
1985. The court held that the fact that the plaintiffs learned that their
daughter had the AIDS virus in 1988 was irrelevant, since the doctor's al-
leged negligence arose from misdiagnosis rather than from the
transfusion. 310
C. LEGAL MALPRACTICE - STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Texas Supreme Court heard three significant cases during the Survey
period that addressed the issue of when a cause of action for legal malprac-
tice accrues. In Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins311 the plaintiffs sued their
former attorneys for malpractice in connection with adoption of a child.
The trial court granted the attorney's motion for summary judgment. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment, holding that
the malpractice action accrued at the time of the alleged malpractice, rather
301. Id.
302. 823 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, n.w.h.).
303. Id. at 363.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 364.
306. 832 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
307. Id. at 166 (discussing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon 1992)).
308. Id. at 167.
309. Id. at 166; see Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1985); see also TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 13.
310. 832 S.W.2d at 167.
311. 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991).
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than at the time of the court of appeals' decision. 312 The Texas Supreme
Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.313
The court held that the statute of limitations was tolled until all of the
Hughes' remedies in the underlying action were exhausted. 314 The court
reasoned that this tolling is necessary in any case in which an attorney com-
mits malpractice "during the attorney's prosecution or defense of a claim
that results in litigation. ' 315 Without tolling, the Hughes would be required
to take inherently inconsistent positions in the underlying action and the
malpractice case. 316 The court stated that in this case, the Hughes originally
claimed that the attorney committed malpractice in handling their adoption
suit, but in appealing the adoption suit, they had to argue that the attorney's
actions were correct or at least not fatal to their claims. 31 7 The likelihood of
the Hughes' success in both suits would have been compromised had they
been required to take such inconsistent positions.3 18 Accordingly, the stat-
ute of limitations on the Hughes' malpractice claim was tolled from the time
the cause of action accrued until all remedies were exhausted. 319
Aduddell v. Parkhill,320 decided on the same day as Hughes, addressed the
question of whether a legal malpractice action based on an attorney's failure
to file an action within the statute of limitations accrues on the date the
action should have been filed or on the date the action was dismissed.32' In
Aduddell, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having asbestosis on April 24, 1983.
On May 20, 1985 his attorney filed a lawsuit in federal court against several
asbestos manufacturers.322 The federal district court held the suit was
barred by the two year statute of limitation, and the plaintiff appealed that
judgment to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district
court's judgment. 323 The United States Supreme Court denied writ of certi-
orari in February, 1988.324 On June 22, 1988, the plaintiff filed this malprac-
tice suit against the attorneys who filed the asbestos suit. 325 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the attorneys, holding that the suit was
barred by the two year statute of limitations.326 The court of appeals af-
firmed. 327 The Texas Supreme Court retroactively applied Hughes and re-
versed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.32
Like Hughes, the court held that the statute of limitations was tolled until all
312. Id. at 156.
313. Id. at 158.
314. Id. at 157.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 156.
317. Id. at 157.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 158.
320. 821 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2998 (1992).
321. Id. at 159.








remedies of the underlying claim were exhausted. 329
In a per curiam opinion, the Texas Supreme Court, in Gulf Coast Invest-
ment Corp. v. Brown, 330 extended the tolling rule announced in Hughes to
cases in which an attorney's malpractice results in a wrongful foreclosure
action by a third party against the client. 33 1 In this case, the client hired the
attorneys to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale of property owned by
third parties. After the sale, the third parties filed a wrongful foreclosure
action against the client. After judgment was rendered against the client in
the wrongful foreclosure action, the client filed this legal malpractice action
against the attorneys. 332 The trial court granted the attorney's motion for
summary judgment. 333 The court of appeals affirmed holding that the cli-
ent's cause of action for legal malpractice accrued when the wrongful fore-
closure action was filed. 334 The Texas Supreme Court, without hearing oral
argument, held that the tolling rule espoused in Hughes and Aduddell should
also be retroactively applied in a malpractice action resulting from a wrong-
ful foreclosure claim by third-parties against the client. 335 The court rea-
soned that a malpractice claim is tolled until the wrongful foreclosure action
is finally resolved. 336
Finally, American Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Korn337 applied the discov-
ery rule to a legal malpractice claim. In this case, the company relied on an
attorney's advice regarding patents and the shop-right doctrine. Based on
the attorney's advice, the company assigned its rights in the patent to a con-
sultant. The company consulted another law firm to obtain a second opinion
after the consultant was issued a patent in 1987. The second law firm ad-
vised the company that if the issue were litigated, there was a substantial
likelihood that a court would determine that the consultant owned the pat-
ent. In 1990, the consultant sued the company for patent infringement. The
company then brought a malpractice action against the original attorneys
who rendered advice on the patent. The trial court granted the summary
judgment on the basis that the claim was time-barred. 338 The Dallas court
of appeals held that legal malpractice sounds in tort and a two year limita-
tion period applies. 339 Further, the court of appeals said that a cause of
action for negligence accrues the moment the plaintiff is entitled to sue the
defendant for damages. 340 Under the discovery rule, the limitation period is
tolled until the plaintiff either discovers or reasonably should have discov-
ered the damages.34 1 Since the malpractice occurred when the company was
329. Id.
330. 821 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. 1991).




335. Id. at 160-61.
336. Id. at 160.
337. 819 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 576 (citing Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1988)).




given the erroneous or incomplete legal advice and the company knew of the
malpractice in 1987 when it consulted another law firm to obtain a second
opinion, the two year period of limitation lapsed before the company
brought suit in 1990.342
VII. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. INTENTIONAL TORT EXCEPTION
Delaney v. University of Houston343 involved a student who was raped in
her dormitory room at the University of Houston. The rapist had entered
the dormitory through a door with a broken lock, which had been reported
to dormitory management on a number of occasions. Delaney brought suit
against the university for breach of contract, breach of express and implied
warranties, negligence, and DTPA claims. The trial court granted summary
judgment for the university, holding that the claims were barred by sover-
eign immunity since the Tort Claims Act does not apply to intentional
torts.344 The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to trial
reasoning that Section 101.057(2) of the Texas Tort Claims Act should not
be read so narrowly as to exempt from the waiver of immunity any claim,
irrespective of its nature, for injuries resulting from an intentional tort.345
Relying on Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.,346 the court recognized
that a negligent actor may be held responsible for the criminal acts of third-
parties. 347
B. USE OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY
In Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v.
Petty,348 the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the government can
be held responsible for injuries resulting from misdiagnosis and mistreat-
ment during institutionalization in state facilities. Opal Petty was confined
for fifty-one years at a MHMR facility with her diagnosis ranging over time
from schizophrenic, mentally ill, not mentally ill, mildly mentally retarded,
to not mentally retarded at all. Her treatment was never effected. Ms. Petty
brought suit complaining she was wrongfully confined and that she suffered
injury because continued misdiagnosis and improper treatment deprived her
of an opportunity to function in society. The jury awarded damages to her
in the amount of $505,000 and the trial court reduced the award to $250,000
under the Texas Tort Claims Act.349 The court of appeals affirmed the judg-
ment. The department argued that the institutional treatment records were
not tangible property under the Texas Tort Claims Act.350 The court, rely-
342. Id. at 578.
343. 835 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1992).
344. Id. at 57 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-.063).
345. Id. at 59.
346. 690 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. 1985).
347. 835 S.W.2d at 59.
348. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 421 (January 5, 1993).




ing on its decisions in Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District351 and Robinson v.
Central Texas Mental Health and Mental Retardation Center,352 held that
misreading and misinterpreting constituted the misuse of tangible property
which will subject the government to liability just as if it were a private
person.353 In affirming the trial court and the court of appeals, the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that the Tort Claims Act does not preclude recov-
ery for injuries resulting from the negligent use of diagnostic records which
are tangible property.354
Conversely, the Beaumont court of appeals, in Jefferson County v.
Sterk,355 held that an arrest warrant is not tangible personal property giving
rising to a cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act.356 This suit was
brought after Sterk's picture was broadcast on the television production
called CrimeStoppers, even though the warrant should have been with-
drawn. Sterk brought suit under the Texas Tort Claims Act contending that
the warrant was tangible personal property. The trial court found that the
warrant was personal property and rendered judgment for Sterk in the
amount of $25,000. 3 5 7 The court of appeals reversed the trial court and rea-
soned that since an arrest warrant cannot be handled, touched or seen by the
plaintiff, it was not personal property for purposes of the act. 358
C. MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATION
LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Independent School District359 involved a
suit brought against the school district under the Texas Tort Claims Act by
a student who hit her head on the rear door of a school bus as she entered it.
At the time of the injury, the bus was not moving and the ignition was not
engaged. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on the
grounds that the waiver of sovereign immunity did not occur in this case
since the bus was parked, the motor was off, the driver was not on board,
and the bus was not being operated. 36°
D. DUTY
In a suit alleging sovereign immunity the Texas Supreme Court, in Fort
Bend County Drainage District v. Sbrusch,361 held that the county did not
owe a legal duty to the plaintiff.362 In this case, the plaintiff was injured
when the bridge he was driving on collapsed. The bridge was built by the
351. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
352. 780 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex. 1989).
353. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 423.
354. Id. at 424.
355. 830 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied).
356. Id. at 263.
357. Id. at 261.
358. Id. at 263.
359. 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992).
360. Id. at 51 (discussing TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.001(2)(B), 101.025,
101.051).
361. 818 S.W.2d 392 (Tex. 1991).
362. Id. at 397.
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drainage district in return for an easement to construct a drainage channel.
The jury assessed the district's negligence in causing the accident at sixty
percent, but the trial court rendered judgment n.o.v. for the district. 363 The
court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment on the verdict for the plain-
tiff.364 The court of appeals reasoned that since the district had voluntarily
assumed the duty to repair the bridge, they had the duty to exercise reason-
able care to assure safety and that the manner in which a district repairs a
bridge is not discretionary. 36 5 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals reasoning that since the district's promise to repair the bridge was
never communicated to the plaintiff, he could never have relied upon it. 366
Since the district neither created the dangerous condition nor assumed a
duty to repair the bridge, the district cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's
injuries. 367
Finally, in State Department of Highways v. Payne,368 the Texas Supreme
Court held that an obscured and unmarked culvert was not a special defect
requiring correction. By finding that the culvert was a premise defect, rather
than a special defect, the duty imposed on the state was lower than if the
culvert had been a special defect. 369 Because of the distinction, the court
concluded that the plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving that the state
knew of the defect and the plaintiff was unaware of its existence. 370
VIII. OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN
A divided Texas Supreme Court declined to recognize the tort of "false
light" in Diamond Shamrock Refining v. Mendez.37 1 In this action, a dis-
charged employee alleged that his employer committed the torts of "false
light" invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress by
circulating information about his termination among his fellow employees.
The jury found for Mendez on both the false light and intentional infliction
of emotional distress counts awarding him $920,000 in damages. The court
of appeals affirmed the judgment holding that the standard in false light
cases is negligence rather than actual malice.372 The Texas Supreme Court
reversed and remanded on the basis that if the tort of false light exists in
Texas, it requires a showing of actual malice as an element of recovery.3 73
The first opinion, written by Chief Justice Phillips, concluded that the least
objectionable alternative is to remand the case for a new trial without ex-
pressly deciding whether the false light tort exists in Texas, and giving the
363. Id. at 394.
364. Id.
365. Sbrush v. Fort Bend County Drainage Dist., 788 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1990).
366. 818 S.W.2d at 397.
367. Id. at 398.
368. 838 S.W.2d at 235 (Tex. 1992).
369. Id. at 239.
370. Id. at 241.
371. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
372. Id. at 199.
373. Id. at 201.
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plaintiff the opportunity to prove actual malice and the defendant the oppor-
tunity to object to the theory of recovery in its entirety. 374 In concurring
opinions, several justices indicated that they may not even recognize the tort
of false light regardless of the standard applied. 375 Justice Doggett, joined
by Justices Mauzy and Gammage, dissented arguing that the Court's action
was an assault on the right to privacy in Texas and that the false light inva-
sion of privacy was recognized in Billings v. Atkinson.376 Thus, it remains to
be seen whether Texas will recognize the tort of "false light" invasion of
privacy.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 202-12.
376. 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
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